

13 March 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Attendees of the Thursday, 15 March, DCI/NIO Meeting

FROM : Presidential Briefing Coordinator

SUBJECT : Nonaligned Movement (NAM) 25X1

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1. Attached is a short think-piece on the nonaligned movement including an appended tentative list of the major tensions and unifying factors at work in the movement.

2. Each NIO with regional responsibilities is requested to consider the following questions from the perspective of his region:

-Does the list of tensions and unifying factors adequately describe the forces at work?

-What will be the net effect of these forces over the next couple years, unraveling, joining ranks or just more of the same?

-In particular, how far can Cuba push the NAM toward supporting Soviet goals without splitting it?

-What would be the impact, if any, of the following notional US policies toward the NAM, benign neglect in bilateral relations of states' activities in the NAM vs. active encouragement of individual states to pursue particular policies in the NAM?

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Attachment

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THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:

The Nonaligned Movement is a loose political association of developing countries. It is one of the principal vehicles by which LDCs project group interests and influence in both regional and global institutions.

Because of its disparate membership, the Movement is continually subjected to tensions and conflicts. Notwithstanding these strains, we believe the Movement will maintain a fairly high degree of cohesion for the next several years because it serves the interests of both the leaders, especially Cuba and Yugoslavia, and the rank and file. Most of the members view the Movement as one of the most effective means at their disposal to represent their interests with the more advanced countries, particularly the superpowers. By and large NAM members share a collective belief that present economic and political power relationships are inherently unjust and that the only means to increase their power is through collective action.

LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE:

The greatest threat to the unity of the Movement is the current struggle for leadership between Cuba and Yugoslavia. Cuba represents the radical faction and Yugoslavia represents the traditional/moderate faction. The struggle reflects the fundamental differences in basic interests of the two countries as well as in their ideologies of nonalignment. Yugoslavia wants to maintain the traditional view of nonalliance to either superpower, while Cuba see a "natural" affinity with the Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia also wants the Movement to focus more on economic development issues, while Cuba wants to focus on political issues.

Cuba wants to use the Movement to meet two primary and sometimes conflicting goals--to pursue an independent foreign policy and to represent Soviet interests in the Movement.

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It recognizes that if it pushes the idea of Soviet alignment too far that the movement may split; that would undermine Cuba's goals.

We believe it is unlikely that the leadership struggle will develop to the point of splitting the Movement. Both Yugoslavia and Cuba realize that to pursue their goals, they must compromise with each other. In addition, they must compromise with the rest of the members. Besides the two dominant factions, there are many sub-factions and the Movement is structured in such a way that it is difficult for any country to completely dominate it.

THE SUMMIT:

Cuba is likely to achieve some of its goals at the Havana Summit, but will have to compromise on others. We expect that the Summit will be a "success", in that the members will maintain unity on issues of common concerns, while putting off consideration of contentious issues.

The declaration is likely to reflect in tone the attitude of Cuba toward a number of issues, particularly ones that are of little interest to the rest of the membership. We do not expect Cuba to be entirely successful in insulating the Soviets from criticism in the declaration.

The members may become embroiled in squabbles over internal organizational issues. Revamping the Coordinating Bureau is a key issue. Depending on the outcome, the role of the chairman (ie., Cuba) could be curtailed. The present 25 member composition of the Bureau is generally more radical than the movement as a whole. Enlarging the membership and opening the Bureau meetings to all members would limit Cuba's flexibility.

Economic issues are not likely to be a major issue at Havana, given Cuba's predilection and the Group of 77's proprietary attitude. The Economic declaration will reflect the mood of the Group of 77 in the wake of UNCTAD V.

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THE FUTURE:

We expect a more active involvement of the Movement in international forums and issues under Cuban leadership-- similar to Algeria's chairmanship from 1973-76. This does not necessarily mean that NAM activities will be inimical to other US foreign policy interests.

Greater attention will be paid to issues involving perceived political domination and economic exploitation of the Third World by the industrialized west, such as foreign military bases (Guantanamo, Deigo Garcia), national liberation movements and the role of Socialist states in helping these movements.

Southern African issues could present a potential problem for US relations with the NAM. If western efforts fail and war erupts, Cuban and Soviet assistance is likely to be sought by the liberation forces. Anti-colonial sentiment will reach fever pitch and drown out any voices of moderation and compromise. Such an event would give Cuba the leverage needed to dictate the direction and aims of the Movement with little opposition.

Another important factor is the role of Yugoslavia should Tito die. There does not appear to be anyone in the Yugoslav heirarchy who is as personally interested in the Movement as is Tito. Tito's death would mean a loss of an important cohesive element for the Movement, and the loss of a major opponent of Cuban domination of the Movement.

It might also present an opportunity for the members to reassess the goals of the Movement, perhaps in a way that Tito's presence prevented.

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TENSIONS -

1. Cuban challenge for leadership
 - a. Wants confrontational approach with west--primarily aimed at the US.
 - b. Wants closer alignment to the Soviet bloc
 - (1) Challenges traditional philosophy of nonalignment
 - (2) Heightens existing ideological conflicts
 - (3) Causes conflict with itself - Cuba want independent forum.
2. Intra-regional disputes
 - a. Divert attention from longer-term goals
 - b. Vietnam-Kampuchea - introduces Sino-Soviet rivalry into movement.
3. Inter-regional jealousies
 - a. Each regional group interested in national or regional problems.
 - b. Africans are largest in number, tend to dominate meeting.
 - c. Arab group presently fighting among itself and unable to exert pressure on rest of membership
 - d. Asians tend to feel isolated
 - e. Latins are more concerned with economic development questions.
4. Ideological factions
 - a. Group comprised of western, pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese and various mixtures of political orientation.
 - b. Theoretical underpinning of Movement- peaceful coexistence-- is outdated and irrelevant to many members.
5. Levels of Development
6. Lack of focus
 - a. Economic issues are dominated by Group of 77, to which all NAM members belong.
 - b. Decolonialism is now only symbolically important, except for Southern Africa
 - c. Disarmament and access to nuclear technology are issues of interest, but only a few members are at level to take advantage of either.

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Against the rather elaborate list of divisive factors, the Movement continues to exist. Some reasons why:

1. Collective belief that the present system is inherently unfair.
2. Members want complete ~~viability~~ ^{sovereignty} political and economic.
3. Believe they must speak as one voice to achieve their goals.
4. Movement provides a forum for soliciting support for special or regional interests.

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